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Get Out of My Driveway! Collins v. Virginia Protects Curtilage from Being Trampled by
the Automobile Exception

Abstract
In Collins v. Virginia (2018), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the automobile exception cannot
justify a warrantless search of an automobile parked in a home’s curtilage because the
automobile exception pertains solely to the search of the automobile, not to the intrusion upon
the Fourth Amendment privacy interest in the home’s curtilage. After giving an overview of
relevant Fourth Amendment jurisprudence concerning the curtilage doctrine and the automobile
exception as well as the history of the exclusionary rule, this article examines the majority,
concurring, and dissenting opinions in Collins and discusses the implications of this important
decision. Collins preserves the heightened Fourth Amendment protection afforded to the home
and its curtilage by refusing to further expand the automobile exception. Collins is also notable
for Justice Thomas’s concurrence, which questions the Court’s authority to impose the
exclusionary rule upon the states. Given the changing composition of the Court, the Court’s
eventual reconsideration of the exclusionary rule’s applicability to the states is a possibility that
bears watching.

Keywords: Fourth Amendment, automobile exception, curtilage, exclusionary rule, warrant,
search
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Get Out of My Driveway! Collins v. Virginia Protects Curtilage from Being Trampled by
the Automobile Exception
I. Introduction
Generally, the police are required to obtain a warrant prior to conducting a search to
comply with the Fourth Amendment.1 This protection is especially important for preserving
privacy in the home and its immediately surrounding area, or curtilage.2 Thus, unless there are
exigent circumstances, when a police officer conducts a search of a home or its curtilage, the
officer must first obtain a warrant.3
While police officers are generally required to obtain a warrant prior to conducting a
search, this requirement is subject to certain exceptions -- including the automobile exception.4
Under the automobile exception, police may conduct a warrantless search of an automobile
without violating the Fourth Amendment, as long as the search is supported by probable cause.5
But what happens when these two doctrines, the automobile exception and the curtilage doctrine,
intersect? Are the police required to obtain a warrant prior to searching an automobile which is
parked within a home’s curtilage?
In Collins v. Virginia (2018),6 the U.S. Supreme Court was confronted with this question.
The Court held that the automobile exception cannot justify a warrantless search of an
automobile parked in a home’s curtilage because the automobile exception pertains only to the
search of the automobile, not to the separate intrusion represented by an officer’s entry of the

1

See Kendra Hillman Chilcoat, The Automobile Exception Swallows the Rule: Florida v. White, 90 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 917, 918 (1999-2000); Lewis R. Katz,The Automobile Exception Transformed: The Rise of a Public
Place Exemption to the Warrant Requirement, 36 Cas. W. Res. L. Rev. 375, 383 (1986).
2
Brent E. Newton, The Real-World Fourth Amendment, 43 Hastings Const. L.Q. 759, 786 (2016).
3
Laura K. Donohue, The Fourth Amendment in a Digital World, 71 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 553, 564 (2017).
4
Chilcoat, supra note 1, at 917-19.
5
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
6
Collins v. Virginia, 584 U.S. ____, 201 L. Ed. 2d 9 (2018).
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curtilage to gain access to the automobile.7 In so holding, the Court refused to expand the
automobile exception in a way which would impede the heightened Fourth Amendment
protection accorded to the home and its curtilage,8 thus preserving the idea of home as inviolable
castle which underpins Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.9 In addition to this important holding,
another notable aspect of Collins is Justice Thomas’s concurrence, which questions the Court’s
authority to impose the exclusionary rule upon the states and suggests that the Court should reexamine this issue in the near future.10
This article examines the Court’s analysis in Collins and the implications of the Court’s
decision. The article begins with an overview of relevant Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
concerning the curtilage doctrine and the automobile exception to provide context for the Collins
decision. It then traces the history of the exclusionary rule, providing a foundation for
understanding Justice Thomas’s argument. The article next examines the majority, concurring,
and dissenting opinions in Collins. Finally, the implications of this important decision are
discussed.
II. Overview of Relevant Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence
The Fourth Amendment protects our persons, houses, papers, and effects from
unreasonable searches and seizures.11 In determining whether the conduct of a government actor
constitutes a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, the Court traditionally
analyzed whether a person’s property rights were physically intruded upon.12 In Katz v. United

7

Collins, 201 L. Ed. 2d at 20-24.
See id.
9
See Stephanie M. Stern, The Inviolate Home: Housing Exceptionalism in the Fourth Amendment, 95 Cornell L.
Rev. 905, 906, 912-15 (2010).
10
Collins, 201 L. Ed. 2d at 24-29 (Thomas, J., concurring).
11
U.S. Const. amend. IV.
12
Jeremy J. Justice, Do Residents of Multi-Unit Dwellings Have Fourth Amendment Protections in Their Locked
Common Area After Florida v. Jardines Established the Customary Invitation Standard, 62 Wayne L. Rev. 305,
8
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States (1967),13 the Court adopted a new approach to analyzing whether a search has occurred by
focusing on whether the government conduct violated a person’s reasonable expectation of
privacy.14 After Katz, courts have generally used a reasonable expectation of privacy analysis to
determine whether government action constitutes a search.15 With the recent resurgence of a
trespass-based analysis in the Court’s Fourth Amendment cases,16 however, it is clear that the
reasonable expectation of privacy analysis did not supplant the traditional property rights
intrusion analysis.17 Rather, there are two ways in which a government actor’s conduct can be
deemed to constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment: (1) if the conduct
violates a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy; or (2) if the conduct violates a person’s
property rights, such as by committing trespass.18
In general, law enforcement officers are required to acquire a search warrant prior to
conducting a search.19 By requiring prior judicial assessment of whether probable cause exists,
the warrant requirement provides a judicial check of executive branch power.20 While there are
some exceptions to the search warrant requirement, unless a search comes within one of the well
delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement, a warrantless search is presumed to be
unreasonable.21
A. Fourth Amendment Protection of the Sanctity of the Home and Its Curtilage

311-13 (2017); see, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451,
456 (1948).
13
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
14
Justice, supra note 12, at 314-15; Katz, 389 U.S. at 357.
15
Justice, supra note 12, at 315.
16
See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012); Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013).
17
Jones, 565 U.S. at 407-12; Justice, supra note 12, at 317-20.
18
Jones, 565 U.S. at 407-12; Justice, supra note 12, at 309-10, 317-20.
19
See Andrew Wrona, How Far Can the Automobile Exception Go? How Searches of Computers and Similar
Devices Push It to the Limit, 43 J. Marshall L. Rev. 1119, 1120 (2010); Katz, The Automobile Exception
Transformed, supra note 1, at 383.
20
See Wrona, supra note 19, at 1120-21; Katz, The Automobile Exception Transformed, supra note 1, at 384.
21
See Wrona, supra note 19, at 1120-22; Katz, The Automobile Exception Transformed, supra note 1, at 385.
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Protecting the privacy of the home is at the heart of the Fourth Amendment protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures.22 Because of the primacy of privacy in the home, in
the absence of exigent circumstances, a search warrant is generally required to conduct a search
of the home.23 Without a warrant, a search of the home is presumptively unreasonable, in
violation of the Fourth Amendment.24
The courts have extended the heightened Fourth Amendment protection afforded to the
home to the curtilage, which is the area immediately surrounding the home and associated with
the intimacies of home life.25 The courts generally determine whether an area is curtilage on a
case-by-case basis.26 This determination is critical because open fields, the area outside of the
curtilage, are not protected by the Fourth Amendment.27 In United States v. Dunn (1987),28 the
Court established four factors to be considered when determining whether an area is part of the
curtilage of a home: (1) the area’s proximity to the home; (2) the area’s location within an
enclosure which encircles the home; (3) the purposes for which the area is used; and (4) the
measures employed to shield the area from public observation.29 However, these factors should
not be mechanically applied, but rather should be considered useful only in so far as they shed
light on the relevant question of whether the area is so intimately associated with the home that it
should receive the same Fourth Amendment protection as the home does.30 Some areas around

See Brendan Peters, Fourth Amendment Yard Work: Curtilage’s Mow-Line Rule, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 943, 948
(2004); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589-90 (1980).
23
See Amelia L. Diedrich, Secure in Their Yards? Curtilage, Technology, and the Aggravation of the Poverty
Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 39 Hastings Const. L.Q. 297, 303-05 (2011).
24
Diedrich, supra note 23, at 305.
25
See Vanessa Rownaghi, Comment, Driving Into Unreasonableness: The Driveway, the Curtilage, and Reasonable
Expectations of Privacy, 11 Am. U.J. Gender Soc. Pol'y & L. 1165, 1165-66, 1177 (2003); Oliver v. United States,
466 U.S. 170 (1984).
26
Rownaghi, supra note 25, at 1175-76.
27
Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
28
United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987).
29
Dunn, 480 U.S. at 301.
30
Id.
22
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the home may be deemed a classic example of curtilage, without any explicit analysis of the
Dunn factors, such as when the Court deemed a front porch to be an obvious example of
curtilage.31
By treating the curtilage as, in effect, an extension of the home, the court provides a
buffer area around the home which protects the private activities of a household from
government intrusion.32 Thus, a warrantless search of a home’s curtilage is presumed to be
unreasonable, and therefore violate the Fourth Amendment, unless there are exigent
circumstances justifying the warrantless intrusion.33
Police officers, however, like any member of the public, are free to observe the curtilage
as they pass by34 and are even free to enter the curtilage along the standard path leading to a
home’s front door for the purpose of knocking on the front door, as any visitor may do, since
such conduct does not constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.35 There
is no search when law enforcement officers observe the curtilage from a vantage point where the
officer has a right to be, such as from an airplane in navigable airspace36 or from the officer’s
position on a public street,37 because any expectation of privacy in items which are left in plain
view out in the open of a home’s curtilage where anyone can see them is not an expectation the
courts are prepared to recognize as reasonable.38 However, before entering the curtilage to

31

Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 7 (2013); Orin Kerr, Collins v. Virginia and "the Conception Defining the
Curtilage": A Familiar Idea "Easily Understood From Our Daily Experience" -- or Is It?, The Volokh Conspiracy,
May 29, 2018 3:44 pm, https://reason.com/volokh/2018/05/29/collins-v-virginia-and-a-thought-on-curt
32
Peters, supra note 22, at 951, 955-57; Kerr, Collins v. Virginia and "the Conception Defining the Curtilage,"
supra note 31; Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
33
Diedrich, supra note 23, at 305-06.
34
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213–14 (1986).
35
Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013).
36
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213–14.
37
See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution,
102 Mich. L. Rev. 801, 813 (2004).
38
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213-14; Diedrich, supra note 23, at.307-09; Donohue, supra note 3, at 589-94.
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conduct a search or seizure within the curtilage based on such an observation, law enforcement
officers must secure a warrant (absent exigent circumstances).39 The mere fact that an item, even
if it is contraband, within the curtilage can be freely observed by passersby from an area where
the public has a right to be cannot justify a warrantless entry of the curtilage by police officers
for the purpose of conducting a search or seizure.40 For areas of the curtilage where there is an
implied invitation for the public to enter the property for a limited purpose, such as the implied
invitation for people to travel the path which leads from the street to the front door – a path
which often includes a portion of the driveway -- to knock on the front door to pay a visit, police
entry of that particular area does not constitute a search as long as the police officer does not
exceed the scope of the implicit license,41 such as by employing a drug-sniffing dog on a front
porch.42
B. The Automobile Exception to the Fourth Amendment Search Warrant Requirement
In Carroll v. United States (1925),43 the Court established the automobile exception to
the search warrant requirement.44 Due to the mobility of automobiles, their highly regulated
nature, and the lesser expectation of privacy in automobiles, the Fourth Amendment does not
require that the police obtain a warrant before conducting a search of an automobile, as long as

39

See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136-37 (1990); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739 (1983) (plurality
opinion) (for the plain view doctrine to justify a seizure, the object seized must be in plain view from a lawful
vantage point at time of observation and the law enforcement officer must have a lawful right of access to the object
at the time of seizure); Alameda County District Attorney’s Office, Plain View, Point of View, Winter 2015,
http://le.alcoda.org/publications/point_of_view/files/W15_Plain_View.pdf (last accessed July 25, 2018); Federal
Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC), Plain View (podcast), https://www.fletc.gov/audio/plain-view-mp3
(last accessed July 25, 2018).
40
See Horton, 496 U.S. at 136-137; Brown, 460 U.S. at 739 (plurality opinion); Alameda County District Attorney’s
Office, supra note 39; FLETC, supra note 39.
41
See Andrew Eppich, Wolf at the Door: Issues of Place and Race in the Use of the “Knock and Talk” Policing
Technique, 32 B.C.J.L. & Soc. Just. 119, 129-30 (2012).
42
Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 7 (2013).
43
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
44
Chilcoat, supra note 1, at 919.
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the police have probable cause for the search.45 Under the automobile exception, the police may
conduct a search with a scope as extensive as could be authorized if conducted with a warrant.46
Thus, if the police have probable cause to believe evidence of a crime is contained anywhere
within the automobile, including in the trunk or inside containers, the police may conduct a
warrantless search of those areas.47
Under the automobile exception, the courts do not examine on a case-by-case basis
whether there were exigent circumstances to justify a search without a warrant.48 Thus, the
courts will not inquire into whether the automobile being searched was in fact in danger of being
moved before the police would be able to secure a warrant.49 Rather, the automobile exception is
a categorical exception – if the item searched is an automobile and the police have probable
cause to search it, then a warrantless search of the automobile does not violate the Fourth
Amendment.50 To constitute an “automobile” within the meaning of the automobile exception,
the vehicle must be readily mobile.51
C. The Intersection of the Automobile Exception and the Curtilage Doctrine
Over time, the automobile exception has expanded by making clear that it is a categorical
exception which applies even when there is no actual exigency (such as when the automobile has
already been immobilized by law enforcement),52 allowing the search of containers found within

45

Id. at 919-26; Wrona, supra note 19, at 1128-30; Katz, The Automobile Exception Transformed, supra note 1,
passim.
46
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982); Katz, The Automobile Exception Transformed, supra note 1, at
408.
47
Ross, 456 U.S. at 825; California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991); Chilcoat, supra note 1, at 922-23;
Wrona, supra note 18, at 1125, 1130-32; Katz, The Automobile Exception Transformed, supra note 1, at 408.
48
See Katz, The Automobile Exception Transformed, supra note 1, passim; see, e.g., Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S.
465 (1999); Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U. S. 938 (1996).
49
See Katz, The Automobile Exception Transformed, supra note 1, passim.
50
See Katz, The Automobile Exception Transformed, supra note 1, passim; Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465
(1999).
51
See Katz, The Automobile Exception Transformed, supra note 1, passim.
52
California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 391 (1985).
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the automobile,53 and even applying the automobile exception to motor homes when relevant
factors indicate it is being used as an automobile.54 Another area where the automobile
exception has the potential to expand is when the police conduct a search of an automobile
parked in a home’s curtilage. Does such a search come within the automobile exception and thus
not require a warrant? Or is a warrant required given the heightened Fourth Amendment
protection afforded to the curtilage?
The lower courts have on occasion been confronted with the issue of what happens when
the police want to search an automobile which is located within the curtilage of a home. This
has resulted in a circuit split, with the Seventh,55 Eighth,56 and Ninth Circuits57 (as well as
Alabama58) holding that the automobile exception permits a warrantless search of an automobile
parked on the defendant’s private residential property and the Fifth59 and Tenth Circuits60 (as
well as Georgia61 and Illinois62) either holding or opining that the automobile exception, at least
in the absence of actual exigent circumstances in the case at hand, does not apply to searches of
automobiles conducted on the defendant’s private residential property.63 With the lower courts
grappling with how to resolve the collision of two Fourth Amendment doctrines, the automobile
exception to the warrant requirement and the heightened Fourth Amendment protection afforded
to the curtilage of a home, this split of authority set the stage for the Court to resolve the issue in

53

California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991).
California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985); Carol A. Chase, Privacy Takes a Back Seat: Putting the Automobile
Exception Back on Track After Several Wrong Turns, 41 B.C.L. Rev. 71, 73-85 (2000).
55
United States v. Hines, 449 F.3d 808, 810-15 (7th Cir. 2006).
56
United States v. Blaylock, 535 F.3d 922, 926-27 (8th Cir. 2008).
57
United States v. Hatley, 15 F.3d 856, 859 (9th Cir. 1994).
58
Harris v. State, 948 So.2d 583, 597 (Ala. Ct. Crim. App. 2006).
59
United States v. Fields, 456 F.3d 519, 524-25 (5th Cir. 2006); United States v. Beene, 818 F.3d 157 (5th Cir.
2016).
60
United States v. DeJear, 552 F.3d 1196, 1202 (10th Cir. 2009).
61
State v. Vickers, 793 S.E.2d 167, 171 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016).
62
Redwood v. Lierman, 772 N.E.2d 803, 813 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002).
63
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, at 18-24, Collins v. Virginia, 584 U.S. ____, 201 L. Ed. 2d 9 (2018). Retrieved
from http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/16-1027-cert-petition.pdf
54
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Collins, where the Court finally weighed in on whether the automobile exception applies when
the automobile is located within the curtilage of the home.
III. A Brief History of the Exclusionary Rule
Another noteworthy aspect of Collins is Justice Thomas’s concurrence in which he calls
for the Court to reconsider the propriety of the Court’s imposition of the exclusionary rule upon
the states.64 In light of this call to revisit this issue, a brief exposition of the history of the
exclusionary rule will provide a helpful foundation before examining the Court’s opinions in
Collins.
The exclusionary rule provides a mechanism for excluding evidence obtained in violation
of a defendant’s constitutional rights from criminal court proceedings.65 It is a remedy created
by the judiciary to deter law enforcement officials from violating constitutional rights. 66 The
exclusionary rule has long been thought necessary due to the impracticality of using costly civil
litigation as a deterrent and skepticism about the effectiveness of administrative complaint
procedures due to the problems inherent in relying on the executive branch to police its own
members.67
A. Establishment of the Exclusionary Rule
Prior to the establishment of the exclusionary rule, the Bill of Rights, including the
Fourth Amendment, was little more than a paper tiger.68 Even though the Constitution forbid
unreasonable searches and seizures, there was little to dissuade law enforcement officers from

64

Collins, 201 L. Ed. 2d at 24-29 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Thomas K. Clancy, The Irrelevancy of the Fourth Amendment in the Roberts Court, 85 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 191,
200 (2010).
66
Id.
67
See Id. at 201-02; Orin Kerr, Why Does the United States Have an Exclusionary Rule?, The Volokh Conspiracy,
July 19, 2008 4:14 pm, http://volokh.com/posts/1216498467.shtml
68
See Harry M. Caldwell & Carol A. Chase, The Unruly Exclusionary Rule: Heeding Justice Blackmun's Call to
Examine the Rule in Light of Changing Judicial Understanding About Its Effects Outside the Courtroom, 78 Marq.
L. Rev. 45, 46 (1994).
65
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getting so wrapped up in their pursuit of enforcing the criminal law that they trampled on
constitutional rights in the process.69 Thus, the Fourth Amendment was largely a right in name
only, as there was not a feasible, effective enforcement mechanism or remedy.70
In Weeks v. United States (1914),71 the U.S. Supreme Court first established the
exclusionary rule.72 However, this rule was only applicable in federal courts.73 Furthermore, it
only applied when federal law enforcement officials, not state or local law enforcement officials,
violated constitutional rights to obtain evidence.74 Therefore, state and local law enforcement
officials could violate a suspect’s constitutional rights to obtain evidence the suspect had violated
federal law and then hand that evidence over “on a silver platter” to federal officials for a federal
prosecution.75 The Court, however, closed this particular loophole when it overruled the silver
platter doctrine in Elkins v. United States.76
B. Applicability of the Exclusionary Rule to the States
Even with that loophole closed, the exclusionary rule only applying in federal courts
posed a problem since regulation of criminal conduct is primarily a state issue and thus the vast
majority of criminal prosecutions are for violations of state law and occur in state courts.77 In
Mapp v Ohio (1961),78 the Court made the exclusionary rule applicable to the states.79

69

Id.
Id.
71
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
72
Donohue, supra note 3, at 565.
73
Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment's Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional Right, 10 Ohio St. J. Crim.
L. 357, 358 (2012).
74
Id. at 360.
75
William Geller, Enforcing the Fourth Amendment: The Exclusionary Rule and Its Alternatives, 1975 Wash. U. L.
Q. 621, 628 (1975); Jared M. Smith, The Evolution of the Exclusionary Rule: From Weeks v. United States and
Mapp v. Ohio to Herring v. United States and Hudson v. Michigan, 2 Grove City C. J. of L. & Pub. Pol’y 215, 22728.
76
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960); Geller, supra note 75, at 630; Smith, supra note 75, at 227-28.
77
See Orin S. Kerr, Fourth Amendment Remedies and Development of the Law: A Comment on Camreta v. Greene
and Davis v. United States, Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 237, 240 (2010).
78
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (1961).
79
Clancy, Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional Right, supra note 73, at 364-65.
70
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Thereafter, evidence obtained through an unconstitutional search or seizure could not be
admitted into evidence at trial in state courts to prove guilt.80 This, of course, provides a
disincentive to police officers who may be tempted to violate the Fourth Amendment to build a
case against a suspect since any evidence obtained in this manner could not be used to prove the
case at trial.81 The line of cases from Weeks to Mapp transformed the Fourth Amendment from a
paper tiger, which promised rights with no enforcement mechanism, to a constitutional provision
with a serious bite.82
The reasoning of the plurality opinion in Mapp indicates the exclusionary rule is an
individual’s constitutional right and the exclusionary rule serves multiple purposes, including
deterring law enforcement officers from violating Fourth Amendment rights, facilitating
consistency between federal and state courts (and thereby preventing federal law enforcement
officers from handing evidence obtained in violation of constitutional rights over to state and
local prosecutors for use in prosecutions in state courts), and preserving judicial integrity by
refusing to allow the courts to become complicit in constitutional rights violations.83 However,
in subsequent years, the Court has retreated from that position and now takes the view that the
exclusionary rule is a creation of the Court, not a personal constitutional right, and that its
purpose is deterrence of police misconduct.84 This shift has undermined the robustness of the
exclusionary rule, which has been narrowed in application due to the Court’s focus on the rule’s
deterrent purpose.85

80

See Caldwell & Chase, supra note 68, at 47-48.
Id.
82
Id. At 46-48.
83
Michael J. Daponde, Comment: Discretion and the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule: A New Suppression
Doctrine Based on Judicial Integrity, 30 McGeorge L. Rev. 1293, 1297-1302 (1999).
84
Id.; United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).
85
Clancy, Irrelevancy of the Fourth Amendment, supra note 65, at 200-01.
81
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C. Erosion of the Exclusionary Rule
The Court has slowly eroded the exclusionary rule over time by restricting the rule’s
application to situations in which the Court deems the benefit of deterring law enforcement
officials’ misconduct to outweigh the cost to the courts’ truth-finding capacity.86 Using this costbenefit analysis approach, the Court has restricted the application of the exclusionary rule by
establishing certain exceptions, such as the good faith exception.87 Under the good faith
exception, evidence will not be excluded when it was obtained while acting in objectively
reasonable reliance on: (1) a warrant subsequently found to have been issued without probable
cause;88 (2) a statute later held to be unconstitutional;89 (3) the court clerk’s computer records,
which were inaccurate (unbeknownst to the police officer);90 or (4) binding precedent which was
subsequently overruled.91 In each of the aforementioned situations, the costs of excluding the
evidence would outweigh the benefits because the exclusionary rule could not serve its deterrent
purpose since there was no police misconduct, as the police officer acted in objectively
reasonable reliance on a third party (a party other than law enforcement) – a judge, the
legislature, the court clerk’s office, or the appellate court.92 The cost-benefit calculation is
clearly informed by the premise that the exclusionary rule’s purpose is deterrence of police
misconduct, not errors of the judicial or legislative branches of government.93

Catherine Cruikshank, Dismantling the Exclusionary Rule: United States v. Leon and the Courts of Washington –
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The Court’s restriction of the application of the exclusionary rule based on a cost-benefit
calculation is not limited to situations where law enforcement officers acted in good faith while
reasonably relying on the work of judicial or legislative branch actors.94 In Hudson v. Michigan
(2006),95 the Court employed a cost-benefit analysis when it decided that the exclusionary rule
would not apply when law enforcement officers violate the knock and announce requirement for
the execution of search warrants, regardless of the officer’s culpability.96 Because there is no
strong incentive to violate the knock and announce requirement since such violations are
unlikely to yield more evidence, the Court deemed it unnecessary to apply the exclusionary rule
to knock and announce violations in the modern context, given the professionalization of
policing and the availability of civil litigation as a remedy.97 Thus, there is a general exception
to the exclusionary rule for knock and announce violations, even when police officers act in bad
faith, because the cost of applying the rule to such violations outweighs any benefits.98
The Court has also refused to apply the exclusionary rule to cases of Fourth Amendment
violations committed due to law enforcement negligence which is attenuated from the police
officer’s constitutional rights violation.99 In Herring v. United States,100 the Court found that the
exclusionary rule did not apply to evidence obtained as a result of an arrest made in reliance on
another police department’s computer records indicating an outstanding arrest warrant where
those computer records were in error due to police department negligence in failing to update the
records.101 The Court focused on the arresting officer’s lack of a culpable mental state and
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reasoned that application of the exclusionary rule to a case of isolated negligence would not
further the rule’s deterrent purpose.102 Once again, the Court found that the costs of applying the
exclusionary rule would outweigh any benefits.103
The Court’s modern view of the exclusionary rule’s origin and rationale has laid the
groundwork for the ongoing erosion of the rule and possibly even reconsideration of the rule’s
continued existence at some point.104 If the rule is solely justified by deterrence, then it should
not be applied when this would serve no deterrent purpose.105 Also, if the rule is merely a
judicial creation, rather than a constitutional right, then the Court is free to reconsider the
wisdom of the exclusionary rule entirely, particularly if the Court decides modern conditions
render the exclusionary rule less necessary than it was at the time of its adoption.106
Furthermore, if the exclusionary rule is a court-created rule of evidence, rather than a
constitutional right, this may call into question the propriety of the Court making the
exclusionary rule applicable to the states.107
D. Other Remedies for Fourth Amendment Violations
The other remedies for Fourth Amendment violations include administrative complaint
procedures and civil litigation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.108 However, these remedies have
limitations with regard to serving as an effective deterrent to violations of Fourth Amendment
rights.109 Administrative complaint procedures are problematic because they rely on the
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executive branch policing its own members.110 Civil litigation is often impractical due to the
costs of litigation and the inability to establish substantial damages in many cases.111 Holding
the police accountable through civil litigation is also limited by the doctrine of qualified
immunity, as the police can only be held liable if there was a violation of a clearly established
constitutional right.112
Given the limitations of these alternative remedies, the continuing erosion of the
exclusionary rule is concerning. Will the rule eventually be eroded to the point that the Fourth
Amendment once again becomes an empty promise, with no feasible and effective remedy?113
Will the exclusionary rule die a death by a thousand cuts?
IV. Collins v. Virginia (2018)
In Collins v. Virginia (2018),114 the Court was confronted with the issue of whether the
automobile exception applies when the automobile is located in a home’s curtilage.115 This case
deals with the intersection of two important Fourth Amendment doctrines – the automobile
exception to the warrant requirement and the curtilage doctrine, which extends the heightened
Fourth Amendment protection afforded to the home to the home’s curtilage.116 Given that the
Court had repeatedly expanded the automobile exception since its inception,117 would the court
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draw a line at the curtilage and refuse to allow the automobile exception to expand in a manner
which would trample the Fourth Amendment protection normally afforded to the curtilage?
A. Facts of Collins v. Virginia
While investigating traffic violations involving a motorcyclist who evaded detention,
police discovered the motorcycle was likely stolen and in Ryan Collins’ possession.118 After
seeing photographs showing the motorcycle parked in a home’s driveway on Collins’ Facebook
profile, a police officer parked on the street near that house and observed a motorcycle covered
by a tarp parked at the top of the driveway.119 The officer walked up the driveway, removed the
tarp, and saw a motorcycle similar in appearance to the motorcycle involved in the traffic
violations.120 The officer ran a check on the license plate and vehicle identification number to
confirm it was a stolen vehicle, took a photograph of the motorcycle, replaced the tarp, and
returned to his police car on the street.121 After Collins came home, the officer knocked on the
front door of the home and during the subsequent conversation Collins admitted to buying the
motorcycle without title.122 Collins was arrested and charged with receipt of stolen property.123
The trial court denied a motion to suppress the evidence acquired via the warrantless
search.124 On appeal of Collins’ conviction, the Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed, holding
exigent circumstances justified the warrantless search, and the Supreme Court of Virginia also
affirmed, holding that the warrantless search was proper under the automobile exception to the
Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.125 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to
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decide whether the automobile exception allows warrantless entry by the police into a home’s
curtilage for the purpose of searching an automobile parked within the curtilage.126
B. Overview of Opinions in Collins v. Virginia
In an 8-1 vote, the U.S. Supreme Court found that the automobile exception does not
allow a warrantless intrusion upon a home’s curtilage to search a vehicle parked in the driveway
and accordingly reversed the judgment of the Supreme Court of Virginia.127 The Court
remanded the case for the state courts to consider whether another exception to the warrant
requirement, such as exigent circumstances, may apply and thus render the warrantless entry of
the curtilage reasonable.128
In the majority opinion, written by Justice Sotomayor, the Court clarified that the
automobile exception cannot justify a warrantless intrusion into the curtilage of a home to search
an automobile located within the home’s curtilage because entry into the curtilage implicates a
separate privacy interest.129 Justice Thomas wrote a concurring opinion in which he agreed with
the result reached by the majority, but questioned the validity of the Court imposing the
exclusionary rule upon state courts and argued that the Court should reconsider this issue in a
proper case.130 In his dissent, Justice Alito opined that the search was reasonable and argued that
requiring a warrant to search a vehicle parked in a house’s driveway when a warrant would not
be required to search that vehicle if parked on the street in front of that house made little
sense.131
C. Majority Opinion in Collins v. Virginia
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In Collins v. Virginia (2018),132 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the automobile
exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement does not allow law enforcement to
make a warrantless entry into a home’s curtilage for the purpose of searching an automobile
parked within the home’s curtilage.133 In doing so, the Court clarified an issue that arises at the
juncture of two Fourth Amendment doctrines: the automobile exception to the warrant
requirement and the heightened Fourth Amendment protection afforded to the home and its
curtilage.134
Writing for the majority, Justice Sotomayor noted that the portion of the driveway on
which the motorcycle was parked, which was adjacent to the house and was enclosed on three
sides by a brick wall and the side of the house, was part of the curtilage of the home, which is
treated as part of the home for Fourth Amendment purposes.135 She observed that the officer’s
entry into the home’s curtilage for the purpose of searching an automobile encroaches on two
distinct privacy interests protected by the Fourth Amendment: an individual’s privacy interest in
an automobile and the individual’s privacy interest in the home’s curtilage.136 Justice Sotomayor
reasoned that just as the automobile exception could not justify a police officer entering a house
without a warrant to search an automobile which is parked inside the house and visible through a
window to all who pass by, the automobile exception cannot justify the police entering the
curtilage of a house without a warrant to search an automobile which is parked within the
curtilage.137
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Justice Sotomayor emphasized that the automobile exception’s scope is limited to the
confines of the automobile.138 She reasoned that extending the scope of the automobile
exception to permit a warrantless search of a home’s curtilage to gain access to a vehicle would
undermine the privacy interest in the home and its curtilage, which is at the heart of the Fourth
Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.139 Justice Sotomayor noted
that such an extension is not justified based on the rationales for the automobile exception, which
are based on balancing the government interest in searching a vehicle and an individual’s privacy
interest in a vehicle, not the privacy interest in a home.140 Therefore, the Court declined to
extend the scope of the automobile exception to encompass the area in which the automobile is
parked when that area is protected by the Fourth Amendment, as the home and curtilage are.141
Justice Sotomayor observed that just as other exceptions to the warrant requirement, such
as the plain view exception, require that police first have a lawful right of access, the police are
required to have a lawful right of access to the vehicle before they can conduct a search of a
vehicle under the automobile exception.142 She reasoned that the automobile exception cannot
provide that lawful right of access to the vehicle when the vehicle is parked within the curtilage
of a home because the automobile exception cannot justify encroaching upon the distinct Fourth
Amendment interest in the home and its curtilage.143 Thus, without a search warrant, entry into
the curtilage of a home for the purpose of conducting a search of an automobile violates the
Fourth Amendment protection afforded to the home and its curtilage.144
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The Court rejected the state’s proposed bright line rule, which would have permitted
warrantless entry into the curtilage for the purpose of searching an automobile with the exception
of any enclosed structure, for several reasons.145 First, there is no reason to think such a rule is
necessary to reduce confusion, as police officers are accustomed to making determinations
regarding whether an area is curtilage.146 Second, being able to see into the curtilage from a
lawful vantage point does not give law enforcement the right to make a warrantless entry into the
curtilage to conduct a search.147 Thus, the proposed bright line rule errs in according such
importance to the absence of a structure shielding an area from public view.148 Finally, the
proposed rule would undermine the heightened Fourth Amendment protection afforded to the
curtilage by deeming some types of curtilage, those not enclosed in a structure, as not being
protected against warrantless entry for the purpose of searching an automobile and thereby
privilege the affluent over those who cannot afford to buy homes with garages.149
In sum, the Court held that, in the absence of exigent circumstances or consent, a search
warrant is required for the police to enter the curtilage of a home for the purpose of searching an
automobile parked within the curtilage.150 The majority reasoned that the automobile exception
cannot justify a warrantless search of a vehicle which is parked within the curtilage of a home
because the scope of the automobile exception is limited to the confines of the automobile, the
automobile exception cannot give the police the requisite lawful right of access to the vehicle
which must be in place before a search can come within the automobile exception, and entering
the curtilage of a home implicates a distinct Fourth Amendment privacy interest in the curtilage
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in addition to the privacy interest in the automobile itself.151 Therefore, when an automobile is
parked within the curtilage of a home, the automobile exception cannot obviate the usual need
for a search warrant before law enforcement officers can enter the curtilage for the purpose of
conducting a search – even if they seek to search an automobile.152
D. Concurring Opinion in Collins v. Virginia
Justice Thomas wrote a concurring opinion153 in which he agreed with the majority
opinion’s resolution of the issue presented, but wrote separately to question the Court’s authority
to require state courts to apply the exclusionary rule when there is a Fourth Amendment
violation, as is currently required by precedent.154 Justice Thomas noted that suppression of
evidence in criminal trials as a means of deterring illegal searches and seizures did not exist at
the time our Constitution was written.155 He observed that although Mapp suggested the
exclusionary rule was constitutionally required, in subsequent cases the Court retreated from
such dicta and clarified that the exclusionary rule is not constitutionally required, but rather is a
judicial creation.156
Justice Thomas observed that the Court describes the exclusionary rule as federal law and
assumes it is applicable in state courts.157 He reasoned that since the exclusionary rule is neither
constitutionally required nor enacted via federal legislation, the exclusionary rule must be federal
common law – in which case the exclusionary rule is not binding on the states, as the
Constitution’s Supremacy Clause only makes the Constitution, federal statutes, and treaties the
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supreme law of the land and does not grant supremacy to the federal common law.158 Justice
Thomas noted that while the Court has recognized certain areas of federal judicially created law
as binding on the states, this has been limited to areas involving the Unites States’ sovereign
duties and interstate or international matters – and the exclusionary rule does not pertain to either
of those areas.159 Aside from these limited areas, state law applies unless the issue is controlled
by the Constitution or federal statute.160
Justice Thomas argued that since the exclusionary rule is not constitutionally required nor
created by federal statute, it is doubtful that the Court has the authority to require state courts to
apply the exclusionary rule.161 Accordingly, Justice Thomas urged the Court to reconsider this
issue in light of the Court’s modern precedents, which do not support mandating that state courts
apply the exclusionary rule.162
E. Dissenting Opinion in Collins v. Virginia
In his dissenting opinion,163 Justice Alito opined that the search was reasonable and thus
did not violate the Fourth Amendment.164 In Justice Alito’s estimation, requiring a warrant for
the police to walk up a driveway of a house to search a motorcycle but permitting a warrantless
search of a motorcycle parked at the curb in front of that house is unreasonable because it out of
step with the practical realities of life.165 Justice Alito emphasized that a finding that the search
occurred within the curtilage is not determinative, as the relevant issue is whether the search was
reasonable.166
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Justice Alito argued that there is no good reason the automobile exception should not
apply to a search of an automobile parked in a driveway of a house since the rationales for the
automobile exception are no less valid when a vehicle is parked in a driveway than when the
vehicle is parked along the curb of the house on a public street.167 A vehicle parked in the
driveway of a house and covered with a tarp is no less readily mobile than if the vehicle were
parked at the curb in front of that house on a public street and covered with a tarp.168 And no
greater privacy interests are at stake when a motorcycle is parked in the driveway of a house
rather than being parked on the street at the curb in front of that house, as a police officer’s brief
walk up the driveway of a house, during which the officer cannot see anything that was not
already visible from the street, does not impair any real privacy interests.169
Justice Alito stressed that the automobile exception is an exigency-based categorical
exception premised on the inherent exigency presented by automobiles’ ready mobility. 170 Thus,
a case-specific inquiry into whether obtaining a warrant was impractical is unnecessary.171
Justice Alito proposed that courts conduct a case-specific inquiry regarding the degree of
intrusion on privacy interests to determine whether a search of an automobile located on private
property is reasonable.172 Thus, a warrantless search of an automobile parked in the driveway of
a home in full view of anyone on the street pursuant to the automobile exception is reasonable
since walking up the driveway is no more than a negligible intrusion on privacy interests, as in
the present case; whereas, a warrantless search of an automobile parked inside a house would be
unreasonable due to the greater intrusion on privacy interests such a search would entail.173
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V. Implications
Collins v. Virginia174 establishes the rule that the automobile exception cannot justify a
warrantless search of an automobile parked within the curtilage of a home because that exception
applies only to the search of the automobile, not to the separate intrusion upon the curtilage to
gain access to the automobile.175 Thus, in the absence of either consent to the search or exigent
circumstances, the police must obtain a warrant prior to entering the curtilage of a home for the
purpose of searching an automobile.176 This clarifies an important issue which arises at the
intersection of the automobile exception and the curtilage doctrine.
The Court’s holding in Collins rebuffs an attempt to extend the automobile exception in a
manner which would have seriously undermined the heightened Fourth Amendment protection
afforded to a home’s curtilage. This ruling ensures that the requirement for the police to obtain a
warrant prior to searching a home or its curtilage cannot evaporate simply because an automobile
is parked there. It is a significant win for privacy, holding the line against governmental
overreaching.
While the automobile exception has expanded considerably since its inception,177 Collins
protects the curtilage from being encroached upon by the automobile exception. This is not
surprising given the Court’s recent resurgent emphasis on property rights infringement as a
useful framework for Fourth Amendment analysis178 and the Court’s recent trend of erring on the
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side of protecting privacy rights.179 Although requiring a warrant to search an automobile parked
in a home’s driveway when a warrant would not be required to search an automobile parked a
short distance from there on a public street in front of the home may appear arbitrary to some,180
Collins clearly reflects the importance the Court attaches to upholding the heightened Fourth
Amendment protection of a home and its curtilage and its unwillingness to use the automobile
exception to chip away at that protection in service of more effective crime control.181
Also notable is the Court’s refusal to privilege enclosed curtilage over unenclosed
curtilage, which would have given greater privacy protection to the affluent than to those with
more limited means.182 By clarifying that the automobile exception extends no further than the
confines of the automobile itself and cannot justify warrantless entry of a home’s curtilage for
the purpose of searching an automobile, regardless of whether the automobile is parked on a
driveway or inside a garage, the Court has preserved the heightened Fourth Amendment
protection afforded to a home’s curtilage for all types of curtilage, rather than deeming certain
types of curtilage (enclosed structures) more worthy of protection than others.183 Given the
scholarly criticism which has been leveled at the manner in which the courts apply the curtilage
doctrine to the disadvantage of the poor, who tend to occupy multiple-occupant dwellings
surrounded by common areas which may not be afforded heightened protection due to the
occupant’s inability to exclude others from such common areas,184 the Court’s refusal to
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privilege costly enclosed structures, such as garages within the curtilage, over more affordable
unenclosed spaces, such as driveways or carports within the curtilage,185 while explicitly noting
the economic discriminatory effect such a rule would have is an encouraging step in the right
direction.
In Collins, the Court treated the determination of whether the area where the motorcycle
was parked was curtilage as an easy call.186 However, it is unclear whether this finding is
uniquely tied to the unusual facts in Collins, where the motorcycle was parked on a portion of the
driveway which was close to the house and within a semi-private nook enclosed on three sides
by retaining walls and the side wall of the house.187 It is unknown whether the Court would
deem a more typical situation of an automobile parked in a driveway in front of a house’s
attached garage, with no walls around the area providing any semblance of privacy, and not far
from the public street as a similarly easy call or whether the Court would apply the Dunn factors
to determine on a case-by-case basis whether each particular driveway is curtilage.188 Will the
Court deem driveways, generally, a classic example of curtilage, as the Court has labeled front
porches?189 Only time will tell, as we must await future court decisions on this issue.
The final outcome for the petitioner in Collins remains to be seen. Mr. Collins may not
ultimately prevail on remand if the state appellate court finds there were exigent circumstances
justifying the warrantless intrusion into the curtilage in this case. Even if the state appellate
court finds there was a Fourth Amendment violation and Mr. Collins thus prevails on remand,
any attempts by Mr. Collins or other similarly situated individuals to hold the police civilly liable
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for a past warrantless search of an automobile parked within the curtilage of a home in the
absence of exigent circumstances will likely fail due to qualified immunity since the law will
likely be deemed as not having been clearly established prior to Collins.
But regardless of what may happen in any of these existing individual cases, Collins
establishes an important rule which the police must follow going forward, thus giving guidance
to both law enforcement officers and courts regarding the interplay of the automobile exception
and the curtilage doctrine. In Collins, the Court has clearly sent the message that the automobile
exception does not permit warrantless intrusion into a home’s curtilage for the purpose of
searching an automobile.190 Going forward, any attempts to rely on the automobile exception as
a justification for a warrantless search of an automobile parked in a home’s curtilage will fail
under the precedent set by Collins and, if the search cannot be upheld on other grounds (such as
exigent circumstances or consent), any evidence obtained through such a search will be
inadmissible in a criminal trial as evidence of guilt. Furthermore, a civil suit to remedy such a
constitutional rights violation should not be barred by qualified immunity, as Collins has now
clearly established this area of law.
Collins is also notable for Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion in which he clearly
signaled he will be looking for any opportunity to re-examine the applicability of the
exclusionary rule to criminal prosecutions in state courts.191 The composition of the Court is
currently undergoing a shift to the right due to the upcoming replacement of recently retired
Justice Kennedy, who has often played a pivotal role as a swing vote.192 Given the age of some
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of the other Justices, the current President may have further opportunities to appoint additional
conservative Justices, depending on the timing of any further departures from the Court and the
length of the President’s tenure in office.193 As the Court gains more conservative Justices,
Justice Thomas may be able to recruit new Justices and persuade some of the existing
conservative Justices to join him in pushing for the Court to reconsider its authority to impose
the exclusionary rule upon state courts. Given the recent trend in the Court’s Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence towards severely limiting the application of the exclusionary rule based on a costbenefit analysis to only situations where applying the exclusionary rule has the potential to
ostensibly effectively deter future police misconduct (and the Court’s corresponding
acknowledgment that the exclusionary rule is a judicial creation with a deterrent purpose, not a
constitutional right),194 the idea that the Court may be headed towards an eventual reexamination of whether the exclusionary rule can apply to the states is not far-fetched. And this
would not be the first time that the Court eventually adopted a view on an important
constitutional issue which Justice Thomas had previously espoused in a concurring opinion, in
which no other Justices joined.195
If the Court were to grant certiorari in a future case to reconsider the issue of whether the
Court has the authority to impose the exclusionary rule upon state courts and decide to overrule
Mapp, this could greatly undermine our constitutional rights. Given that the vast majority of
prosecutions occur in the state courts,196 if the exclusionary rule were no longer applicable to the
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states, in those states which do not have a state equivalent of the exclusionary rule the Fourth
Amendment and other important provisions of the Bill of Rights may be rendered largely
ineffectual due to a lack of feasible remedies and effective disincentives to trampling on
constitutional rights in the pursuit of crime control objectives.197 In those states that do not have
their own exclusionary rule, there would be little effective redress for Fourth Amendment
violations, as civil lawsuits are often impractical in light of the resources necessary to bring
litigation and administrative complaint procedures can be problematic since they rely on the
executive branch policing its own members.198 Additionally, the Court’s recent jurisprudence
has signaled a troubling trend of ruling in favor of the police on qualified immunity issues,199
further eroding any possibility that civil liability could be an effective deterrent to constitutional
violations by the police.200
Overruling Mapp has the potential to significantly undermine the strides which have been
made in the professionalization of law enforcement, as there will be less incentive for police
departments to invest in the continual training necessary to keep officers abreast of developments
in constitutional law.201 Furthermore, if the exclusionary rule were to cease being available as a
remedy against unconstitutional conduct committed by state and local police, this might hinder
the development of case law concerning the contours of the Fourth Amendment, as criminal
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defendants would be less likely to raise Fourth Amendment issues for the courts to resolve – and
this is particularly concerning since today’s rapid technological developments give rise to a great
need for the courts to decide how settled Fourth Amendment principles apply in light of new
technologies.202 Finally, overruling Mapp would harm the legitimacy of the courts, as seeing the
courts accept evidence obtained in violation of constitutional rights, and thereby implicitly
sanction such violations, would undermine public confidence in the courts as a body which
upholds the law.203
VI. Conclusion
Collins v. Virginia (2018)204 sets an important precedent which prevents the automobile
exception from undermining the curtilage doctrine. Collins establishes that the police cannot
rely on the automobile exception to enter the curtilage of a home without a warrant for the
purpose of searching an automobile.205 Instead, when the police have probable cause to search
an automobile and that automobile is parked within a home’s curtilage, the police must secure a
warrant before conducting the search to justify the intrusion upon the curtilage (unless there are
exigent circumstances or there is consent to the search).206
This is an important victory for the privacy we all enjoy in our homes and their curtilage.
The fact that an automobile, which the police have probable cause to search, is parked in the
curtilage of a home does not give the police carte blanche to enter the curtilage and conduct a
search without a warrant.207 Collins reminds the police that, in the absence of exigent
circumstances or consent, they must get a warrant before conducting a search within the curtilage
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of a home, regardless of what item is the object of the search -- even if it is an automobile.208
This preserves the important judicial check on executive branch power inherent in requiring a
judicial determination of probable cause prior to a search of a home or its curtilage.209 It also
clarifies the interplay of two doctrines, the automobile exception and the curtilage doctrine, for
law enforcement and the lower courts.
In the wake of a long-term expansion of the automobile exception which begged the
question of whether this expansion would see no end,210 Collins serves as an important signal
that the automobile exception does have an important limit: it stops at the edges of the
automobile and thus cannot justify intrusion upon the area surrounding the automobile when an
automobile is parked in a home’s curtilage.211 As we move into an era where cars increasingly
incorporate new technologies which result in automobiles containing far more information than
they did in the past, it remains to be seen whether the Court will further reign in the automobile
exception.212 Given our ability in modern times to quickly obtain warrants through electronic
means213 and the wealth of information which may be present in automated and connected
cars,214 as such technologically advanced vehicles become more common, how might the Court
further halt or reverse the expansion of the automobile exception? Will the Court carve out an
exception to the automobile exception prohibiting warrantless searches of the technology
incorporated into automobiles, similar to the Riley v. California (2014)215 holding requiring a
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warrant for searches of cell phones found on persons incident to arrest?216 Or might the Court
reconsider the automobile exception altogether in light of the privacy concerns raised by the
great amount of data stored in such vehicles and the relative speed with which warrants can now
be obtained?217 As the distinctions between automobiles and computers blur due to advances in
technology,218 will the Court reconsider the wisdom of having an automobile exception?
Whether the court will put the brakes on the automobile exception in the future due to the
implications of technological advances remains to be seen, but for now the Court has at least
imposed an important limit on the previously ever-expanding automobile exception: the
automobile exception goes no further than the confines of the automobile itself.219
Justice Thomas’s concurrence raises the specter of what the future may hold for an
exclusionary rule which has been under sustained attack for many years now. While it remains
to be seen whether anything will become of Justice Thomas’s musings regarding his skepticism
of the Court’s authority to impose the exclusionary rule on the states, as the Court’s composition
shifts to the right, this bears watching.220 If Justice Thomas is able to persuade enough Justices
that the Court should reconsider Mapp, this has the potential for a seismic shift in the remedies
available to criminal defendants whose constitutional rights have been violated and a consequent
retrenchment of Mapp’s legacy of professionalizing policing by removing incentives for police
departments to maintain proper accountability mechanisms and police training on legal issues.221
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